

Analysing media representation of corruption in Ukraine: who is panicking?

Anna Markovska and Alexey Serdyuk¹

Introduction

While the smoke of the battle on the Maidan Square was clearing, this chapter was finalised discussing another interesting year, that of 2012: for some it was a year of pride because the country hosted its first major sporting event, while for others, the year was marked by fierce debate on human rights, political imprisonment and the high level state corruption. In May 2012, the reported advice on travel to the country were very different, ranging from “*stay at home, watch it on TV. Don’t even risk [going] because you could end up coming back in a coffin*” (BBC, 2012), to the un-famous speech of the President of Ukraine who aimed to invite more people to visit the country during the spring time of 2012, as “*the trees are in blossom and women are getting undressed for the summer*” (Youtube, 2012). Once the FA Cup 2012 started, British football supporters summarised their experience in Ukraine as: “*beer is cold, girls are hot*” (BBC, 2012).

Before and during the football event of the spring 2012, European leaders were united in reporting the abuse of human rights in Ukraine, describing the state of “bandits and crooks”, and as such creating the short span of media interest and even moral blaming about the ‘bad state’, Ukraine. However, few traces of this were to be found by January 2013. Then one of the dominant news about Ukraine reported by Euronews and other European sources concerned its government signing a major gas exploitation deal worth a potential 7,5 billion Euro (BBC, 2012), an important development for the country in transition. It seems nothing is more fleeting and short-lived than media attention. So, does that matter?

Yes, it does matter: the media are the eyes and ears of the general public of all that people cannot observe themselves, and that is almost the whole world outside their

¹ Dr. Anna Markovska is a senior lecturer in criminology at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Anglia Ruskin University; Dr. Alexey Serdyuk is a head of the Scientific Research Laboratory of the Distance Education, Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs.

own premises. Media broadcasts can make and unmake heroes and folk-devils: in 2004 *The Scotsman* reported on the knighthood of Fred Goodwin, quoting the chairman of RBS Group who said that the honour is richly deserved. Only a few years later Mr Goodwin was publicly shamed for his role in the collapse of RBS, was named as “a man who sank the bank”, and who was stripped of his knighthood (Robinson, 2012). This media makability has its limits: the downfall from public favour is usually irreversible. A media folk devil is unlikely to return as a hero. In England Guy Fawkes remained a folk devil (though in New South Wales a national park carries his name). This applies to individuals, institutions as well as whole nations.

Media sources portray events in order to inform, to establish interest, to blame or to set up conditions for *moral panic*. Young (2011) describes three criteria in determining the presence of moral panic:

1. understanding “*whether social reaction is significantly disproportionate to the problem, as it presents itself at the present moment*” (Young, 2011: 251);
2. understanding the character of representations, as such, the *irrational character* of the reaction is a second criterion of moral panic;
3. a third criterion “*involves negative stereotype of a deviant, a reaffirmation of normality and the denigration of the transgressive other, a person or a place where one definitely doesn't want to be*” (*Ibid.* : 254).

Mass media actively participate in constructing “*the reality and particular configurations of social relations*” (Ericson, 1991: 222). Of course, there is an interaction with the ‘receiver’ of the news: one cannot sell every folk-devil to every audience, as the introductory example above makes clear: the football fans did not buy the devilled depiction of Ukraine and discovered to their delight that beer and girls were both acceptable. So, though fleeting and transient media are, they do matter, even if sometimes difficult to predict.

Our second and related starting point in this chapter is to consider Levi's (2009) elaboration on conditions conducive to devilling and to moral panic and non-devilling and to no moral panics in relation to white-collar crimes. While Levi (2009) discusses a very specific representation of identity theft and investment fraud, we propose to extend his arguments and analyse corruption using non-devilling and devilling paradigms. We then aim to briefly analyse the media representation of crime in Ukraine in general, and concentrate on the analysis of media representation of two recent events in the country: *Euro 2012*, the football tournament hosted by Ukraine and Poland, and the *Shell Agreement* about the exploration of the shale gas signed by Ukraine in 2013. We consider the examples from national Ukrainian and international media sources in order to explore varied ways in which the presentation of events are in different ways susceptible to the application of the *devilisation*

techniques in media reporting. The targeted subjects are *corruption* and *racism* in Ukraine.

To devil or not to devil?

Law breaking and becoming ‘folk-devilled’ is not an automatic outcome. And if one is depicted as folk-devil, it does not necessarily follow that one is considered an evil threat to society. Levi (2009: 49-50) analysed ‘moral panic’ in relation to financial crimes and argued as follows. First,

“most corporate fraudsters are, for most of the time, only ‘folk-devils-in waiting’ because their actions do offend some sectors of public morality, those actions (even when of dubious legality) are not seen as being dramatically different from the routine functioning of capitalism. Nonetheless, some social groups and elite individuals who commit frauds are ‘folk-devilled’ as outsiders because their background or the individual nature of their offences enables their portrayal as ‘organised criminals’ or as ‘rogue traders’ who have clearly transgressed both official and moral values. They are not seen as seriously threatening the economic and/or moral fabric of society.”

Does this uncertain outcome also apply to elite-law breakers in Ukraine? In this chapter the authors look at the representation of the Ukrainian political elite in two contrasting situations, before and during the Euro 2012 and during the Shell agreement negotiation 2013, arguing that one background was more conducive to the devilling than the other.

Levi’s second point is that *“most questionable corporate practices and personnel are able to maintain a subterranean existence characterised by low visibility to outsiders. In this, they are aided by the ‘softly, softly’ approach of the enforcement agencies, media averse to the genuine risk of libel suits, and governments and public almost superstitiously afraid of meddling with the market, at least until September 2008”* (2009: 49). This observation is country specific. In contrast, the present authors will identify a difference in the representation of the Shell gas agreement within the national Ukrainian media and by western media: devilling is “in the eye of the (media) beholder” and the ‘West beholder’ may differ from the ‘East beholder’.

With white collar crime it can happen that moral ‘cracks’ or the moral panic that society is on the verge of moral collapse is experienced *“when corporate crimes become embodied in visible and known persons”* (*Ibid.*: 50). What is noticeable in Ukraine is that the idea of ‘moral collapse’ and low morality has been widely accepted by the general population in the sense that it feels that morals have already collapsed. People discuss systemic corruption, in general trust is very low and the criminal justice system is seen

as serving the needs of the rich and powerful (Boiko, 2012). In such situation, a burst of moral outrage is very difficult to initiate. It is difficult, but not impossible as the events of November 2013 in Ukraine suggest. If there is a moral outrage about the level of corruption in a country where corruption is systemic, how and who should satisfy ‘the public taste for retribution’? The country’s folklore has some wisdom in saying, “*those who in [in prison] should be let out, those who are out should go in [in prison]*”. Levi (2009) points, “*the white-collar offender is only folk-devilled when he frightens the horses*”. In other words, politicians and law enforcement practitioners should feel that without reacting to the issue of white-collar criminality they can endanger their own positions, and the public can turn against them. And so it happened in Ukraine that the political leaders did not understand this: the absence of the will of the political elite to tackle corruption in Ukraine or even to mention it, led to the violent protest of January–February 2014. The east of Ukraine had a slogan “stop them stealing” in Russian, and the west of the country say the same thing but in the Ukrainian language.

The question is where do you find the sources that can ‘frightened the horses’? Are they to be found outside, as representatives of international media and international pressure groups? Can we trust the local civil society to deal with this, and the local media to support the cause? Provided there is a media interest that leads to moral blaming, will moral panic begin? Can we predict its outcomes? Levi argues that it is difficult to predict the longer term outcomes of these panics. In some situations, it is also difficult to establish the moral panic about corruption and white-collar criminality.

Levi (2009: 62) elaborates on the examples of identity theft and investment fraud to suggest conditions conducive to devilling and moral panics in relation to (other) white-collar crime (for example, “*powerful political devillers or totalitarian state, low defamation risk for journalism*”) and conditions that are conducive to *non*-devilling and to *no* moral panics in relation to (some) white-collar crime (for example, conditions such as “*restrictive libel laws, journalist intimidation, plus fear of protective laws*”, lack of motivation to alarm the public).

Given this uncertainty, for us it is interesting to observe the relationship between folk devilry, moral panic and corruption in Ukraine. Following Christie (1986) and Levi (2009), it may be argued that the creation of folk devils should work very well in Ukraine because there is “a simple juxtaposition of good victims and evil perpetrators”, hard working members of the general public opposite to hard working but corrupt officials and politicians.

Media and Crime

Media reporting crimes has been a focus of attention for a number of years. Chibnall (1977: 23) discusses “*eight professional imperatives which act as implicit guides to the construction of news stories*”. Naturally, news must be “news”, “*it is about what has just happened*” (*ibid.*), but there must be something more which transcends this tautology. Apart from ‘informativeness’ there must be an emotional arousal of curiosity, that will be dependent on the dramatisation, personalisation, sensationalisation and titillation imperatives in construction the news stories (*ibid.*). Any newsman knows there are only a limited number of arousals for the markable product, sex and fear being the most prominent. An element of the fear is *moral panic*. Young (2011) discusses how moral panic *then* and *now* differs. He writes: “*The moral panics coalesced around the feeling of resentment with regard to an older generation against youth cultures which carried with them harbingers of the future. The present period this side of 9/11, the recession and restructuring of the economy is accompanied by the breakdown of community and the rise of an unparalleled hyper-diversity of ethnic and sub-cultural formations*” (*ibid.*: 256). According to Young, it is no longer about the intergenerational conflict, but it is about “ontological disturbance and widespread economic insecurity” (*ibid.*). In the diverse world the focus of attention shifted to the bad other, or as Young (2010) defines them, ‘transgressive other’: it can be a country or a group of people within a country.

To become a ‘transgressive other’ a number of forces should be in place, forces that are described by labelling and sub-cultural theories as the “*actors and reactors, deviants and controllers*” (*ibid.*: 247) who operate in a certain cultural context. The label of ‘transgressive other’ can be applied to the individuals, groups or the country as a whole. For example in Ukraine, ‘transgressive others’ are politicians and businessmen, and for the rest of the world, Ukraine is considered as transgressive other because of the absence of the rule of law. In January 2014 David Cameron mentioned Poles living in the UK while discussing EU citizens working in the UK and claiming child benefits for children living abroad, hence creating a label of ‘transgressive others’ and applying it to the specific group of population (BBC, 2014). The label of ‘transgressive other’ is a very powerful one, as given it strikes the right accord: it has a potential to lead to the moral panic.

Public fear fuels moral panic and sustains political interests around the transgressive others. Critcher (2011: 259) argues that fear can be symbolically constructed, and as such, it can distort and misrecognise social realities, it can generate the hostility to outsiders. The authors look at the fear created by different actors in the representation of the same events.

Media, crime and (corrupt) politics in Ukraine

Different labels were given to describe the stage in the development of the post-Soviet countries. The term ‘*anomie*’ can be applied to define the new cultural goals for many, but the financial success of only a selected few. In Soviet times, the aspirations of financial success were limited to the selected few (either the underground businessmen or the corrupt elite), while the rest of the country was busy building communism employing their own imagination and networks. ‘Dirty togetherness’ was originally introduced by Podgorecki (1987) as a feature of the shortage economy and in reference to “*diquishness and close-knit networks in the context of scarcity and distrust of the state*” (in Wedel, 2005, 102–103). The law-abiding majority of the country was very much aware of the “*symbiosis among politics, law and criminality*” (*ibid.*: 103) but resigned to this state of their society. This symbiosis of the Soviet era imposed restricted physical and moral boundaries: the boundaries being clearly defined by the communist party in terms of the means of production and the state ownership.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this very severe imposition or restriction collapsed as well, and meanwhile transformed politicians into business people, criminals into politicians, and provided more prominence to legal professionals, who can now help to move people and money. Twenty-three years of transformation later, and Ukraine is still an example of an endemically corrupt country. “*I think he is not struggling for Ukraine under his rule, but Ukraine under his personal property*”, said Zamyatin, Ukrainian political analyst (Ayres, 2014). Corruption is not a new problem for Ukraine, but the present government centralised corruption. For example, in 2012, the President signed a law eliminating the need for state enterprises to issue public tenders for contracts, meaning “*there is now no transparency over billions of dollars in government contracts,*” (Akymenko, as quoted in Ayres, 2014).

The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer survey of ordinary people showed that “*69 per cent of Ukrainians think that corruption has increased in the past two years and 80 per cent believe that the government’s actions to fight corruption are ineffective*” (Transparency International, 2014). The report shows that Ukrainians view the judiciary, public sector and law enforcement as the most corrupt sectors in the country (*ibid.*). If crime control is an industry captured by the state (Christie, 2001), the problem in Ukraine is in the fact that the state has been captured beforehand by a section of the criminals it is supposed to control. Politicians and state officials become agents who “*subvert their own role or suborn others to influence legislation in ways which directly or indirectly benefit them personally*” (Philp, 2001: 1–8). A theatre of absurdity in its own right.

Discussing politics and power in Ukraine Hale (2010: 84) writes “*the 2010 elections disappointed by amply revealing the stomach-churning nature of Ukraine’s democracy,*

so unruly and corrupt that most Ukrainians question whether it is really a democracy at all". Hale suggests that Ukraine is not a democratic failure either, "in fact, it is partly the dirtiness of Ukraine's democracy that sustains it and in fact augurs well for long-term success" (*ibid.*). For the Ukrainians the dirtiness is the most repugnant and at the Maidan Square the protesters showed their determinedness the clean that up.

As a post-Soviet state Ukraine inherited a number of problems, including and often originating from high levels of corruption and the absence of the rule of law. It has been argued previously that Ukraine can be considered an example of the captured state (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001; Markovska and Serduyk, 2012). Soviet legacy has also encouraged (already existing) clientelism, discussed by Hale as "specific punishments and rewards meted out to specific individuals" (*ibid.*: 85). The mechanism that sustains democracy in Ukraine, according to Hale (2010: 95-96), is better understood as an example of a rare combination of competitive clientelism that is rooted in a division of executive power, and that is capable of creating an opening for public opinion to matter directly. The division of power prevents "any one side from utilising corruption opportunities to dominate politics" (*ibid.*: 96).

Analysing the relationships between media and politics during the 2010 presidential election, Hale (2010: 88) pointed out:

"the chief editor of Telekritika, a journal devoted to monitoring media practices in Ukraine, reported that both campaigns concluded actual contracts with editors to buy positive reports as election day approached. Some such material would be marked explicitly as advertising, but much would not, being presented instead as news stories without any indication that they were paid for . . . one indication that much of the media was for sale is that sometimes similarly positive articles about rival candidates would appear in the very same issue of the same publication."

Media manipulation is a subject for debate within the Western and established democracies, with many politicians being accused of creating very strong ties with media corporations, such as the erstwhile Prime Minister Berlusconi. Media for sale is not an anomaly that puts Ukraine in a different camp of countries. What puts Ukraine in a different camp is the fact that there is too many sale assistance, too much corruption, and very few channels to follow the exposure of the press.

The monitoring of the quality of news reported by nine main TV stations in Ukraine (Telekritika, 2013) provides an interesting insight in the realities of the news reporting and the priorities of the news of the day. Reporting on the information provided from May-September 2013, Telekritika (2013) reports that not a single TV station reported on the facts or issues that would be considered unprofitable for the officials. Devilling and non-devilling media parameters in Ukraine work as a powerful tool in the hands of the government and elite. It leaves journalists to

concentrate on reporting road traffic accidents and violent crimes, providing only a selection of pre-confirmed news on freedom of speech, white collar and economic crimes (Telekritika, 2013).

Case study

In order to analyse devilling and non-devilling aspects of the media representation of serious crimes we looked at two events: Euro 2012, the football tournament hosted by Ukraine and Poland, and the Shell Agreement about the exploration of the shale gas signed by Ukraine in 2013. The authors conducted a content analysis of the selected Ukrainian media (in Ukrainian and Russian) and selected English speaking sources, with the aim to contrast the views and representations of both groups of sources published in English within the UK.

In Ukraine six sources were selected, four newspapers and two magazines. These sources have been identified on the basis of the results of the study conducted by TNS marketing, as the most popular. The National Internet search engine was used to select the articles in Ukraine. Table 1 shows the sources and the number of publications per source.

Table 1
The list of the sources and the number of the articles analyzed
for Euro 2012 and Shale gas 2013

	«Euro 2012»	«Shale gas»
Ukraine		
Facts (Факты / Факты и комментарии http://fakty.ua)	24	4
Segodnya (Сегодня http://www.segodnya.ua)	38	23
Korrespondent (Корреспондент http://korrespondent.net)	74	44
Ukrainski tuzhden' (Український тиждень http://tyzhden.ua)	113	30
Kommersant (Коммерсантъ http://www.kommersant.ua)	54	11
Zerkalo nedeli (Зеркало недели http://zn.ua)	6	32
Total	309	144

The search was limited by the date of publications. In the case of Euro 2012, the selected time frame for publications was from May to July 2012 (one month before and one month after the games), 309 articles were selected for analysis. In the case of the shale gas agreement the time frame was from December 2012 to February 2013 (one month before the agreement was signed and one month after), resulting in 144

articles selected for analysis.

a. Euro 2012

In the case of Euro 2012 we have excluded all articles discussing football games as such, and selected 309 articles for our analysis. The three main content indicators studied were: (a) *racism and xenophobia*, (b) *corruption*, (c) *anti-social behaviour*. It was important to register not only the number of the relevant articles, but also, the problem indicators of the content of the story. Three indicators are identified: problematisation of the issue (the problems exist); rationalisation of the issue (the problem does not exist), and neutral representation (representation of the issue without clearly assigned label of ‘bad’ or ‘good’). On the one side of the continuum there is problematisation with a negative connotation, on the other is rationalisation, absence of negative connotation, and in the middle there is a neutral representation that state the problem but does not push it to one or the other side of the extreme.

Table 2
Results of the content analysis of the Euro 2012 representation in the Ukrainian media (N=309)

Representation				
Content indicators	<i>Problematisation of the issue</i>	<i>Rationalisation: the problem does not exist</i>	<i>Neutral representation of the issue</i>	Total = 100%
Racism	2 (0,6%)	46 (14,9%)	261 (84,5%)	309
Corruption	29 (9,4%)	8 (2,6%)	272 (88%)	309
Antisocial behaviour	17 (5,5%)	18 (5,8%)	274 (84,5%)	309

Table 2 shows that the majority of the articles present the issues identified in the neutral and judgement free way without a clearly assigned label. For the purpose of our analysis it is interesting to look at the two columns where the judgement is that comments are offered. *Racism* has been discussed more than any other theme. 15,5% of publications discussed racism, however, the publications deny the existence of racism as a problem: only two articles out of 309 analysed state that racism is a problem in the Ukrainian society. The problem of *corruption* was discussed in 12% of the publications, and most articles confirmed it as a problem. The problem of *anti-social behaviour* was identified in 11,3% of the publications, and interestingly, the evaluative nature of these publications is rather ambiguous: the articles do not deny that there is a problem with anti-social conduct, but insists that the Ukrainian militia tackles this problem. The newspaper Segodnya reported that “*during the championship*

there were 293 crimes against foreign citizens . . . All the crimes were committed by the citizens of Ukraine and the majority of these crimes have been solved already by the militia” (Segodnya, 2012). Problem solved.

b. The shale gas agreement

For the representation of the shale gas we considered two main indicators: *corruption* and *environmental consequences*. Similar to the previous case, three separate groups have been established: problematisation of the issue (the presence of the indicator of corruption and the environmental harm); rationalisation of the issue (the problem does not exist), and neutral representation (representation of the issue without clearly assigned label of bad or good). The results are presented in Table3 below.

Table 3
Results of content analysis of the selected sources representing the shale gas agreement signed by Ukraine (N=144).

Content indicator	<i>Problematisation of the issue</i>	<i>Rationalisation, the problem does not exist</i>	<i>Neutral representation</i>	Total = 100%
Ecological harm	45 (31,3%)	10 (6,9%)	89 (61,8%)	144
Corruption	12 (8,3%)	1 (0, 7%)	131 (91%)	144

Table 3 repeats the pattern of representation shown in Table 2, and as such the majority of the articles state the issue of ecological harm and corruption in a judgement free manner. Critical discussion of the corruption in the agreement about the shale gas exploration features only in 9% of the national articles, and most of the articles in this subgroup are suggestive to the corrupt elements of the deal: as such they discuss it as a problematic context (12 articles, 8,3%). For example, *Korrespondent* (2012) reports,

“there are three flies in the ointment, two small and one large [the original text says: three spoons of tar in the barrel of honey]. The first one is that the Ukrainian media and the leaders of the opposition suspect that the agreement signed with Shell has direct interest of the family of the Ukrainian President, this is due to the fact that a small and not well known company called SPK-Geoservis features in the draft of the joint enterprise. The second is about those who oppose the exploration of the shale gas argue that it will lead to the ecological catastrophes. The third fly ‘was placed’ by the Gasprom, the Russian gas monopolist, who is extremely agitated and staged economic and informational attacks on Ukraine.”

These 12 articles are very critical to the manner in which the agreement was reached

at the local levels in the regions of Ukraine where the exploration will take place, arguing that the agreement was rushed through and that the legal procedures were not observed. Overall, from the Ukrainian side there is an involvement of corrupt politicians, from the side of the foreign investors, there are “*foreign executives, representatives of the clans of Rockefellers, the owners of the Royal Dutch Shell, who will, according to the agreement destroy our eco system in the next 50 years.*” There are three sources of fear: (1) the outsiders, (2) the activities of the western company and the Russian party; and (3) the insiders: the activities of corrupt government officials.

Problematisation of the ecological consequences is the most developed and charged area of concern, with 31,3% of the articles discussing negative consequences. Segodnya newspaper (2013) states that “*the foreign investors are coming to pollute our air and water*”. The newspaper quotes Ecologist William Zagorodskij who says, “*the whole world is against the shale gas exploration, however in Ukraine the Cabinet of Ministers signed the decision to allow exploration*”. The newspaper Tuzhden pointed to the fact that the leaders of the opposition promised to conduct an investigation into the details of the agreements signed by Shell and Nadra Yuzivska (the shale gas field). With one newspaper stating that “*our oligarchs wouldn't stop if there is a smell of money*”. Corruption was negatively presented in 8,3 % of the articles.

There are some interesting contrasts to be observed when comparing the Ukrainian national press to the representation of the same issues in the UK. In the UK we used LexisNexis search to identify relevant publication (22 in total), analysing sources such as the *Times*, *The Independent*, the *Guardian*, *The Financial Times* as well as the BBC. Both events featured in the news: Euro 2012 was widely represented, providing not only sport comments, but also extensive comments on the background of the country. In contrast, the shale gas agreement Ukraine signed with Shell, was in the headlines almost exclusively to comment on the financial context of the agreement.

Naturally, events that happened or concern one country, in this case Ukraine, will be more represented in the national paper, rather than in the foreign media. The sample of the Ukrainian newspapers allowed us to quantify the data. The low frequency representation of the news about Ukraine in the UK allow only a more qualitative character.

Ukraine as one of the two hosts of the Euro 2012 had a rather negative reception in the British media. Most sources used the event to discuss the political, economic and social issues within the country. For example, *The Telegraph* in an article published on the 6th May 2012 discusses “*Ukraine's controversial Euro 2012*” and the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister Julia Timoshenko. In the reference to the president and the Ukrainian government the article uses phrases such as “*the only thing bandits care about is family and money. European countries need to freeze their foreign*

bank accounts”, “they [Ukrainian officials] don’t think about the criticism and the shame in front of the world because they are gangsters.” *Sunday Telegraph*, June 3rd, 2012, discusses racism, corruption and human rights abuse in Ukraine as a background to the discussion of the Euro 2012. In anticipation of the event and during the event, the media used the opportunity to comment on the country’s profile, specifically pointing to the issues of human rights, racism and corruption within the government. These issues provided the media with the space to discuss their concerns about the football supporters travelling to the country and their safety.

To the end of the tournament *The Independent* commented: “After the final whistle-Ukraine’s dark future of corruption” June 30th, 2012, discusses “a tournament that went a lot better than many expected in terms of organisation and fan experience”; the article turns attention to allegations of corruption surrounding the president and his government. “The government sees its power not as a service for the people but as a resource for profit for its members and their families.” There is a reference to “a shadowy entity based in Donetsk with a murky ownership structure, that nevertheless won more than half a million worth of government contracts for construction projects related to the Euros.” Interestingly these accounts of corruption were more frequently to be reported by the Ukrainian regional papers.

Moving on to the newspapers reporting on the shale gas deal agreement signed by Ukraine, *The Financial Times* (2013) points to the “potentially big step in reducing Ukraine’s reliance on costly imports from Gasprom”, quoting experts who claim that the agreement is the “paradigm shift for Ukraine, a major step towards energy independence.” It is the dependency on the gas from Russia that dominated the representation of the news in Reuters and BBC. The overwhelming tone of the articles was about the positive impact of the signed agreement on Ukrainian economy, with many articles featuring the Ukrainian president shaking hands with the Shell official. “All the big boys were there” reports the *New York Times* (2012).

What is interesting to us here is how we can explain such an unfavourable evaluation of the football event by British media, and a positive response to the agreement signed by the president of the country, who, only six months before, was described by the same media sources as in charge of a ‘crooked and bandit’ government. It is possible that the answer lies in the devilling and non-devilling conditions described by Levi (2009)?

Conclusion: explaining the devilling or not-devilling dilemma

The representation of the two events inside and outside of Ukraine had different accents. For the ease of the comparison we will talk about the reaction of the East (Ukraine) and the West (British media sources).

So, the West presented:

1. Euro 2012 in the lights of racism, human rights abuse, totalitarian state, selective justice;
2. Shale gas exploration as a positive step for Ukraine, removing dependency on Russia.

The East presented:

1. Euro 2012 as a big success, with the local police working well, featuring corruption during the tender process and construction, but mainly attempting to concentrate on the positive sport image;
2. The shale gas agreement as a very problematic one. It features very detailed analysis of the ecological issues, discussion of corruption and corrupt schemes inside the agreement, looking at the agreement as a political show off in front of Russia.

The questions to be asked are: why discussion of corruption dominated the western representation of the Euro 2012, but not the shale gas agreement with Shell? In other words, why the media in Ukraine orchestrated the devilling of the shale gas deal and the West created the 'moral blaming' about the Euro 2012, but remained in a non-devilling mode about the other side of the shale gas agreement?

On the basis of the indicators suggested by Levi (2009) we can observe that in the case of the Western media and Euro 2012, powerful political leaders (Germany and the UK) were united in devilling the authority of the totalitarian state. The good and democratic West opposed the evil and totalitarian East. This case can be considered as an easy one for the journalists to portray and not be afraid of the defamation risks. Corrupt Ukrainian government officials were identified as a 'suspected offender population'; the opposition leader in prison worked as a message to help to separate good from bad. The Ukrainian population as well as those who decided to attend the games were presented as possible victims.

Why then, was the shale gas agreement not scrutinised as much by the Western media? Perhaps claims about the presidential family private interests in the deal created a message that is personalised, and different from claims of endemic and systemic corruption in the country. Personification (naming people as responsible) is much more difficult to deal with than generalisations. The claim 'Ukraine is corrupt'

is much easier to publish than that the president of the country is corrupt. The presence of the big western player, makes it also difficult to report on corruption due to the libel laws in the West. As a general statement and on a general level, Ukraine may be corrupt and have corrupt government, but on a very specific matter, the representative of the Western world in the shape of the Shell company, is a different actor to take into the account.

When the East discussed the losses following the possible shale gas exploration it was about the ecological damage and corruption. When the West discussed the losses it was about politics and economy, the issues that are more appealing to the public. Moral issues were relevant within the Ukrainian media, and not within the western response. This is interesting as it is a reverse situation from the representation of the Euro-2012 games. Both sides generated fear and hostility by identifying the bad other.

The news production depends on participation of two groups: the deviant actors and the reactors, and it is by placing the two groups in the “structure and historic time” (Young, 2011) that could help us to understand the outcome. It is obvious that the West receives the information on the endemic nature of corruption in Ukraine, but finding the opportunity to act and react on these messages has been a very complicated business. The big sport event provided a good ground to expose many problems and to raise public awareness about the situation, personal messages could be hidden, and the momentum was there to portray the full picture. On the other hand, the agreement to explore the shale gas is personalised news item for the West, because it includes big Western players and the named political and economic representatives from both sides. In a reverse situation, the East found it easier to criticise the agreement using personalised claims of corruption. It may be the case that some sources that do expose corruption in Ukraine do it on a daily basis, and thus the element of distinct dramatisation is not always present in the stream of exposures. Interestingly, when the sources do mention corruption they mentioned it in the neutral, label free context. As discussed above, in the country where corruption has been centralised and spread endemically within the criminal justice agencies, exposing corruption does not necessarily lead to the investigations, and enforcement.

Levi (2006: 1054) argues that “*structural, cultural and personal factors interweave and interpenetrate to ‘produce’ news and documentaries . . . The publicity becomes the template for cultural conflict.*” Is that reflected in the contents of the written news broadcasting of the two events? In the case of the Euro-2012, the Western media appeared to have a structural and cultural interest in portraying Ukraine as less civilised, less disciplined. In contrast, the shale gas agreement was presented as a civilised way to build a strategy for future developments in Ukraine. The Ukrainian media presented both events in a rather different way using another template for conveying news items. One can

observe the short term memory of the press from one side, and a message overload from the other side. The West presents and forgets, the East presents corruption and its many forms and shapes, but that not much changes. The representation of corruption in the media should be a very powerful element for the template of cultural conflict. The problem in Ukraine is that publicity of corruption cases very rarely leads to a reaction from the side of the authorities. This is not surprising given the scale of corruption in the country. 'Moral panic' that the West so often blames as an overrepresentation and overreaction from the side of the (western) authorities, to a certain extent is not discernible in Ukraine as a kind of 'emotional peak'. It almost does not matter what is published there, as the well-known chain-reaction of the 'moral panic' will not happen because the on-going rampant corruption smothered the ignition of that chain reaction of emotions. One can say that the underlying emotions in the Ukrainian society remained slumbering.

Slumbering, but not dead. From 22 November 2013 onwards a series of sharp negative *stimuli* brought these emotions to life and evoked the Maidan Square revolt.

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